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Abstract 
 
Basell III was a direct answer to the 2008 financial crisis. Now 10 years after 
the crisis, it is time to assess its timeliness and make the necessary 
adjustments so it becomes truly global. 
 
In this policy brief, we first clarify the goals of macroprudential policy before 
highlighting the main challenges that home and host countries may run into 
when global financial institutions lend beyond their home countries.  
 
We then suggest to focus on four priorities to address these vulnerabilities:  
- An adaptable and flexible global framework  
- The generalization of international standards and best practices 
- A stronger global data depository 
- Regulatory and monitoring cooperation 
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Challenge 
 
Macroprudential Policy in a Nutshell 
 
Understanding the fundamental rationales behind macroprudential policy is essential 
to appreciate how it complements monetary, fiscal, and structural policies. Indeed, 
financial regulatory policies are not enough to address systemic risk, and other policies 
— especially monetary and fiscal policy — have roles to play, depending on the 
underlying cause of the problem 1 . Relying on macroprudential policy to counter 
aggregate shocks such as commodity price shocks or policy deficiencies such as 
poorly conducted microprudential and monetary policies would not be the appropriate 
answer. 
 
Macroprudential supervision is concerned with the stability of entire industries and the 
health of the relationships within the financial sector that can significantly impact the 
economy. More specifically, its principal goal is to monitor systemic risk and to 
enhance the resilience of the financial system so it can fulfill its three main functions 
(to provide the core financial services of intermediation, risk management, and 
payments) even when under significant stress.2  
 
 
Policy 
 
Objective 
 
Level of Impact 
 
 
Monetary 
 
Price stability 
 
Macro: stable economic 
growth 
 
Macroprudential Stability of financial 
sector 
 
Both macro and micro 
 
Microprudential Stability of financial 
institutions 
Micro: protection of 
consumers 
 
 
 
The G20 used macroprudential principles to design a coordinated policy answer to the 
2007-08 crisis. Basel III has yet to be fully implemented — see Table 1 —, but so far 
the outcome is clear: banks (and insurance companies) have been pressured to 
reduce their complexity, leverage, and riskier lines of business to decrease the 
chances of another financial crisis. Nonbank financial intermediaries have stepped in 
to fill the vacuum, and alternative financial instruments have helped to rearrange 
                                                          
1 Bruni and Lopez(2019) 
2 IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) 
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intermediation needs across different actors. Market-making activities are subject to 
new transparency requirements, ensuring that more financial products will be traded 
through exchanges, instead of over the counter.  
 
We are highly supportive of this framework and of the FSB work programme for 
2019.3 More specifically, we strongly agree that ending too-big-to-fail can only work if 
the last step is operational. That is it requires a well-identified resolution authority 
and an orderly resolution plan for SIFIs ( banks, CCPs…) that is implementable in 
time of crisis.4  
Furthermore, the global political, financial and economic conditions have changed 
since Basel III was initially designed, and the framework should be adjusted to reflect 
the new sources of vulnerabilities. More specifically in this brief, we emphasize the 
challenges that home and host countries may run into when global financial 
institutions lend beyond their home countries. We propose to focus on the following 
four priorities to address these issues:  
- An adaptable and flexible global framework  
- The generalization of international standards and best practices 
- A stronger global data depository 
- Regulatory and monitoring cooperation 
                                                          
3 FSB (2019) 
4 See Lopez et al. (2017, 2018) 
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Table 1: Implementation of reforms in priority areas by FSB 
 
 
 
C/LC/MNC/NC stand for compliant/largely compliant/materially-noncompliant/ non-compliant with Basel III. OTC derivatives: 
further action required to remove barriers to full trade reporting (R) or to access trade repository data by foreign authority (F). 
 */** Non-bank financial intermediation: Implementation is more advanced than the overall rating in one or more / all elements of at 
least one reform area (MMFs), or in one or more / all sectors of the market (securitisation).  
Source : FSB (2018), see page 4 for more details 
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Proposal 
 
The quiet buildup of financial “fault lines” leading up to the 2007 crisis was due in part 
to financial institutions’ and regulators’ growing overconfidence in their ability to 
manage risks. Financial institutions were confident they had eliminated most of their 
risks by hedging their known idiosyncratic (individual) risks with products like credit 
default swaps, and diversifying exposures based on historical return relationships (e.g. 
real estate performance is a mostly local phenomenon so a sustained nationwide 
downturn is mathematically near impossible). Regulators monitored individual 
financial institutions in an attempt to ensure that no single body was taking outsize 
risks. Unfortunately, both sides ignored the build-up of risk outside of the scope of their 
purview. 
While many of the weaknesses identified during the crisis have been addressed, the 
risk of complacency and overconfidence remain high in our eyes. Indeed, the current 
framework overlooks unexpected consequences such its spillovers on smaller or less 
developed countries. The increase of capital inflows in the non G20-advanced 
countries over the past 10 years — see Figure 2 — also indicates the strengthening 
of the connections between countries; hence any brutal changes in these flows can 
become an issue beyond the less developed markets: by attracting more capital flows 
a country is more integrated into the global financial system, and it can affect it—
directly or indirectly. Ultimately, the resilience of the domestic and international 
financial system depends in part on countries’ ability to adopt and to effectively 
implement the relevant international regulatory and supervisory policies and standards 
while their financial system deepens. 
While for many of these countries their global importance is to come, the time to act is 
now: there is always a lag between the speed of change in a country’s financial system 
and in its regulatory oversight. This is especially true when it comes to less developed 
countries, due to the lack of fully develop institutions that would provide the expected 
information (data collection) and its analysis.  
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Figure 2: Global Capital Inflows by Destination Country Group, Annual Average 
    (a)   2005-2007                                     (b)   2015-2017 
  
Source: Adams-Kane and Lopez (2019) 
What are the risks? 
Focusing on the global impact of the macroprudential policy framework, we have 
identified the following five sources of vulnerability that require the immediate 
attention of the G20. Most of them arise when large financial institutions have 
activities outside their home country. 
Underestimating a build-up in credit risk in countries that have institutional 
weaknesses, such as inadequate company accounting, auditing, financial reporting, 
and disclosure, as well as the absence of an adequate credit bureau or register. While 
the local authorities may have a better understanding of local conditions, it is difficult 
to share that knowledge with a foreign institution or regulator effectively. Indeed, the 
foreign-owned institution’s risk management and measurement systems might not 
work well due to the poor quality of economic and financial data on borrowers, 
misleading the institution as well as its home country regulators.  
Regulatory arbitrage increases with the greater presence of foreign-owned financial 
institutions, especially when it comes to lending via subsidiaries, branches, non-bank 
financial institutions owned by foreign banks, or direct cross-border loans. Hence, 
regulators in less developed countries with a large presence of foreign financial 
institutions tend to have difficulties in preventing the emergence of a credit boom or to 
bring it under control without the help of foreign regulators.  
Implementing the current policy framework at the global level is still very much 
a work in progress. Basel III is the most recent effort in a series of attempts to 
enhance and expand international regulatory standards, especially for banks. 
Advanced G20 Rest of World
$232 Billion$389 Billion
$889 Billion $8.4 Trillion
China Emerging G20 Excl. China
$3.7 Trillion
$762 Billion
$389 Billion
$197 Billion
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Ultimately, the goal is to help countries’ financial system resilience by addressing 
structural weaknesses such as those in capital adequacy; liquidity positions; lending 
standards; risk management systems; bank governance; supervisory and reporting 
frameworks; and licensing, competition, and bankruptcy arrangements. The treaty was 
a direct response to a crisis that originated in the advanced economies. Given the 
large differences in the degree of financial market development between advanced 
and emerging economies, some of the recommendations may not be relevant. 
Foreign and national regulators may have complementary jurisdiction in the 
presence of global financial institutions—, especially banks. In less developed 
countries, this may lead to a mismatch in policy priorities between foreign and national 
supervisors and regulators, especially when a local crisis emerges. For instance, host 
authorities may be concerned about local financial instability risks (such as boom-bust 
cycles in domestic asset prices or demand and external balance pressures resulting 
from rapid credit growth). They may not have the tools or authority to mitigate them 
because foreign institutions may be outside of local authorities’ jurisdiction. The 
evolution of separate institutional responsibilities in many countries has complicated 
this matter: the central bank is usually responsible for financial stability and 
macroeconomic policies, while a financial supervisory authority is primarily concerned 
with the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions.  
Prudential supervisors’ conflicts may rise when a foreign-owned subsidiary or 
branch is systemically important locally and runs into problems. The incentive effects 
flowing from crisis resolution arrangements play a key role. During times of acute 
problems, the host and home supervisors may have different incentives. The primary 
concern of the parent institution’s home country supervisor is to prevent the subsidiary 
from bringing into question the solvency of the entire firm. In contrast, the host 
country’s main concerns are to mitigate liquidity and solvency problems at the 
subsidiary level and to maintain overall lending and capital inflows to the country. 
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Policy recommendations: 
The G20 is an essential platform to discuss and design such cross-border policy 
framework and standards. The diversity of its members, with very different levels of 
economic and financial development, ensures the representation of a broad range of 
views. However, the 2008 financial crisis triggered the last comprehensive discussion 
on financial reforms—a crisis driven by financial activities in the United States and 
other advanced economies. Officially, 2019 is the final year for the implementation of 
Basel III: it is an appropriate time to assess what are the necessary changes to make 
this macroprudential policy framework truly global. 
On the one hand, it needs to accommodate different degrees of economic and 
financial market development within the same system. On the other hand, financial 
market integration requires international coordination and cooperation to function 
effectively. 
These are very ambitious goals. Achieving them requires that the discussions and 
negotiations within the G20 framework take into account all point of views, from 
advanced and less developed economies. We believe that these discussions should 
focus on the following four priorities: 
1. An adaptable and flexible global framework:  The global regulatory and 
monitoring framework needs to be made pertinent for a wide range of 
economies and financial systems and able to address their specific issues. 
Rapid advances in financial technology are making available a wide range of 
tools for developing and modernizing emerging countries’ financial systems 
even when they do not have a well-developed banking system. The existing 
regulatory and monitoring frameworks must adapt to reflect such developments. 
 
2. The generalization of international standards and best practices: Reliable 
and standardized sharing of information and data across the globe is key to 
effective risk monitoring and management. However, many emerging countries 
need technical support from international institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank to adopt and implement the (relevant) standards and to supply the 
necessary training to develop the required in-house expertise and monitoring 
infrastructures. 
 
3. A stronger global data depository: Directly linked to the previous point, it is 
essential to develop the relevant reporting, supervisory and regulatory 
infrastructures that will enable the effective and safe sharing of relevant data 
and analysis. 
 
4. Regulatory and monitoring cooperation: When an internationally owned 
financial firm has a local branch or subsidiary that is locally systemic, the local 
regulators may require help from home regulators for timely and effective action 
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in advance of a crisis. This coordination requires agreement about goals and 
priorities among advanced and emerging market regulators who may face 
different incentives. Ultimately, the tools and mechanisms available for 
coordination need to be explained clearly and mutually agreed upon well before 
the outbreak of any crisis. While effective coordination to pre-empt a crisis is a 
very ambitious goal, it starts with discussions and negotiations within the G20-
framework that will take into account all point of views, among advanced and 
emerging market policymakers. 
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